Introductio n
According to many observers of Russian politics, the 1996 presidential election, in which Gennady Zyuganov won 43 percent of the popular vote in the second round against Boris Yeltsin, was in all likelihood the "last hurrah" of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation . As they saw it, support for the party was concentrated among elderly pensioners, while support for political and economic reform was strongest among the younger cohorts of voters . According to Vyacheslav Nikonov, a leading analys t of Russian politics, the Communists were a dying breed : "There is no correlation between living conditions and the communist vote. The correlation is age" (quoted by Lally 1997) .
A substantial body of survey data backed up Nikonov's assessment . In interviews conducted in the waning years of the Soviet Union, Finifter and Mickiewicz (1992) report finding that elderl y respondents (those over age 60) were far less supportive than those in younger age groups of the basi c tenets of political and economic reform . They were less likely to see the value of competitive election s and freedom of speech, less likely to assign responsibility for one's well-being to the individual rather tha n the state, and less tolerant of income disparities . l , similarly, reported that in a series of surveys conducted between 1990 and 1992, elderly Russians were considerably mor e likely to agree that an orderly society took precedence over individual freedom, that Stalin was not bein g given enough credit for building socialism, and that political reform in Russia was advancing too rapidly .
Similar findings abound, including those of Bahry (1993) and Reisinger et al . (1994) .
To most Westerners it seems surprising that elderly Russians are so much more supportive of the Communists, in that it was this generation that directly suffered the calamities wrought by Stalinism .
There are two major explanations that are usually given as to why this is, nevertheless, the case . First, during the early, formative years of their life, the currently elderly were subject not only to the horrors o f totalitarianism but also to "totalitarian socialization" (Gibson 1996) . In the world in which they grew up, it was the Communist Party, unerringly directed by Comrade Stalin, that brought about rapi d industrialization, victory in the Great Patriotic War, and Sputnik . This explanation thus posits a generational effect, as it is understood in cohort analysis . A similar phenomenon in this country is th e association of Franklin Roosevelt and the Democratic Party with ending the Great Depression. Voters who entered the electorate at about this time, the "New Deal" Democrats, remained disproportionately supportive of the party over the course of their entire lifetimes (Andersen 1979 ) .
The second major explanation was that elderly pensioners were badly injured by the reforms that ended the Communist regime . In particular. the extremely high rates of inflation that occurred in 1992-94 effectively wiped out their retirement savings . Pensioners also experienced degradation in medical care and other support services . This resulted not only from cuts in direct government expenditures, but als o from the desire of newly privatized enterprises to minimize social welfare expenditures on current an d former employees . To be sure, retirement in the Soviet Union was never to be confused with tha t experienced in Ft . Lauderdale, but it did afford a certain modicum of security . With the affluence of the New Russians there has also come the New Poor -the elderly pensioners one sees on the streets o f Russian cities, selling off their belongings to help make ends meet (Varoli 1996) .
As noted frequently in the Western news media, life expectancy in Russia, which was never al l that high to begin with, fell dramatically in the 1990s, particularly among males . Table 1 , taken from Hough, Davidheiser, and Lehmann (1996) reports mortality rates for various age cohorts of Russian me n and women for the years between 1990 and 1994 . As these data indicate, mortality rates for all cohort s rose, but the sharpest increases were among Russian men over the age of 60 . Based upon these figures, we can estimate that roughly one fifth of the voters who were pensioners at the time of the 199 1 presidential election had died by the time of the 1996 election, and that by 2000 nearly half of the 199 1 pensioners were gone . Groskomstat, 1996) , p . 33 .
(Reprinted in Hough, et al ., p . 94 . )
The supporters of market-oriented reform thus seem to have time on their side . The transition to a more market-oriented economy may have cost millions of casualties among the elderly, but there are fewe r of them today than there were yesterday, and there will be fewer tomorrow than there are today . In a recent prognosis on the future of Russian politics, former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (1997) put it this way:
Perhaps the most significant and hopeful statistic I've seen : although 65% of those Russians over the age of 65 think things got worse over the last year, 60% of those unde r 35 think things got better . So among the positive trends underway in Russia is perhap s the most basic of all, the one represented by the actuarial tables .
The persistence of Communist support
If the "dying out of the communists" scenario is valid, we should have observed a significan t The results of these elections, however, reveal that overall support for the Communists persisted a t previous levels . In December of 1999, approximately 30% of voters cast their ballots for the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) and its closest allies ("Communists for the USSR", "Stalin' s Block" etc), which was actually a bit higher than the 28 % they garnered in the December 1995 elections. • HI : Support for the Communist Party is evenly distributed across various age cohorts .
• H2 : Russian voters become more supportive of Communist Party as they move into retirement age .
The correlation between age and support for the Communists is thus a "life cycle" effect and not a "cohort" effect.
The first hypothesis holds that the correlation between age and Communist support that wa s observed in many previous studies is actually not present, or at least no longer present . It implies that
Russian voters cast their ballots one way or another depending upon any number of factors, e.g., their approval or disapproval of the incumbent president, their evaluation of the consequences of marke t reforms, events in Chechnya, but not factors that covary strongly with age . Contrary to Talbott' s speculation, this hypothesis also implies that support for continuing market reforms depends upon the extent to which reforms are actually successful in improving conditions in general, and not just i n redistributing resources to the young from the old .
The second hypothesis, in contrast, holds that we should continue to observe a correlation betwee n age and support for the CPRF . This correlation, however, is due to the ongoing success of th e
Communists in attracting the support of "new" older voters, and not the fading legacy of the Stalinis t generation . If this is the case, it would presumably be because Russian pensioners find the policie s favored by the Communists, e .g., higher levels of state-sponsored benefits and price controls on consumer goods, preferable to the policies favored by their opponents . Contrary to the cohort effect posited by the "dying out of the Communists" scenario, a "life cycle" effect of this nature means that support for th e
Communists among pensioners is constantly being replenished by the influx of new pensioners (Convers e 1976 ; Mason and Fienberg 1985) . If present, we would continue to observe a strong correlation betwee n age and vote choice, with no drop off in overall support for the Communists .
Analysis
In order to examine these hypotheses we have undertaken an analysis that compares the size an d nature of the "pensioner" vote in the 1991, 1996 and 2000 presidential elections . This analysis is based upon voting returns and demographic data, aggregated at the rayon level2 , and consists of two major parts :
comparison of 1991/1996 (part 1) and 1996/2000 (part 2) returns . Although we do not have observations from all rayons, we do have, as shown m Table 3 . an entirely adequate and representative sample of 1,43 6 rayons distributed across all major economic and political subdivisions of the country . The most obvious way in which to test our hypotheses would be to regress change (between 199 1 and 1996, and, then between 1996 and 2000) in the percentage of votes going to the Communist candidat e upon change in the percentage of pensioners in each rayon . The relative performance of the Communist s would be expected to decline in those rayons that lost the largest number of pensioners. This turned out not to be feasible, because in most rayons the percentage of pensioners changed very little over this tenyear period. It is hard to explain variance in the dependent variable with an independent variable that ha s little variance .
There is, however, another estimation strategy available . As indicated earlier, by our estimate s roughly one-fifth of those who were pensioners in 1991 were gone by 1996 and about one-halve wer e gone by the year 2000 . To the extent they were replaced by individuals from a younger, less Stalinis t cohort, we would expect support for the Communists in this category of voters to be diluted . We can thus If support for the Communists among pensioners was diluted between the first and the secon d elections, then, in the manner described above, we would expect the coefficient for the pensioner vote i n the second election relative to that in the first (B 2 -B1 ) to be negative . In order to properly specify thi s equation, we need to also estimate the across-the-board changes in support for the Communist candidat e between the two elections . We thus specify a dummy variable for observations made in the second election, in addition to a constant term . We also specify dummy variables for each of the 48 regions an d
republics from which the rayons in our sample are drawn . This is necessary because of the substantia l regional variation in support for the Communist party .
Another complication we need to address derives from the fact that there were three majo r candidates in the 1991 presidential election -Boris Yeltsin, the Communist candidate Nikolai Ryzhkov , and Vladimir Zhirinovsky -two rounds in the 1996 presidential election and only one round in the 200 0 presidential election . Rather than speculate as to the best way to specify the dependent variable, w e thought a preferable strategy would be to run the regression on several different permutations . To th e extent our results do not vary with the way we specify the dependent variable, we can be confident in thei r robustness . It should be noted that in some of these equations the dependent variable is pro-Yeltsin, an d thus our expectations about the signs of the coefficients would be reversed .
We used the following pairs of votes in the first part of the analysis : (1) Results of the 1991/1996 part of our regression analyses are reported in Table 4 . The top number in each entry is the regression coefficient, the bottom number the standard error . Note also that coefficients associated with the 48 regional dummy variables are not reported . This is exactly what the findings from the survey data discussed previously would have predicted . But contrary to the hypothesis that pensioners' support for the communists had become diluted over th e intervening five years. we see that the elderly were actually more supportive of the Communist candidat e in 1996 than they had been previously . Clustered around .5, the coefficients we estimated in the first three equations for the "pensioners. second election" term must be added to the coefficients of the "pensioners , Turning to the other equations reported in Table 4 , we see that the coefficients in the Yeltsi n equations are smaller, but still sizable . They thus indicate that pensioners' opposition to Yeltsin, whil e already quite strong in 1991, was much stronger in 1996 . We can thus be confident that our results do not depend upon any particular specification of the dependent variable . Finally, we see that although pensioners were somewhat more supportive of Zhirinovsky in 1991, by 1996 they were no more likely than younger cohorts of Russians to vote for him .
Results of the 1996/2000 part of the analysis are reported in Table 5 . The first row o f coefficients, which denote pensioners' support for a particular candidate in the 1996 election, is roughl y similar to the sum of the first and second rows in Table 4 , which is what we had hoped to see . The much smaller coefficients in the second row basically indicate that pensioners, as a group, were as loyal to th e Communist party in 1999-2000 as they had been four years earlier, despite a large amount of replacement of individual pensioners (who had died) by new individuals who became eligible for pensions during the intervening period .
in According to our reading of the situation, however, this was not the case . The pensions Russians receive are certainly quite modest, but payments have been indexed to inflation and are probably not muc h lower in real terms than they were when the reforms began . Although whatever savings they might hav e had in Sberbank were wiped out, most Russians have long kept much of their savings in other forms .
They also received title to their apartments ; given the high property values of Moscow and other majo r cities, this means that they would experience a windfall profit were they to sell their apartment . This is not meant to minimize the very difficult material conditions under which many elderly Russians live, but onl y to note, as Varoli (1996) reports, that : "Their plight is not as severe as portrayed by the mass media" (p .
11) .
In our view, it was not pensioners, but rather Russian workers approaching retirement who wer e disproportionately injured by the transition to a more market-oriented economy . They, too, suffered the loss of savings, but in many cases they also lost their jobs . Although many such workers remain on the company payroll, there is in fact no work for them and they are infrequently paid . Unlike younger workers, they simply lack the time to learn the new skills and new habits that the economy now calls for .
During the years spanned by the three Russian presidential elections, then, those who had bee n pensioners in 1991 were joined by large numbers of new pensioners who had suffered badly during th e final years of their working lives . While not officially counted as unemployed, many, in fact, had no work and received little pay . For such people, becoming old enough to receive a pension actually marked an improvement in their material conditions . As retrospective economic voters, they thus strongly supporte d
Zyuganov in 1996 and in 2000 . In short, the "new" pensioners who entered this category between 199 1 and 1996 were substantially more supportive of the Communists than those who had died . That support remained intact between 1996 and 2000 presidential campaigns .
This is probably pretty good news for Zyuganov and the Communists . According to data on the age structure of the Russian population, there are many millions of people over fifty years old and, thus , too old to smoothly transition to the ways of the new economy . Support for the Communists among such people is disproportionately strong, and old workers (who are soon-to-be pensioners) will remain a ver y large category of voters for many years to come.
